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About set theory
Go¨del and the Foundations of ... What?
Set theory: (Georg Cantor 1874-1883)
• abstract extensions (sets 6= properties)
• iterability (forming sets of sets of sets ...)
• multiple infinities (transfinite arithmetic)
• a foundation/framework for (meta-)mathematics
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• multiple infinities (transfinite arithmetic)
• a foundation/framework for (meta-)mathematics
Some skeptics: non-constructivity, metaphysical dimension
- Kronecker: Cantor as “corrupter of the youth” (19th)
- Wittgenstein: “utter nonsense”, “laughable” (20th)
- HoTT disciples: inconvenient for math, computerization (21th)
Axiomatic set theory
Foundational crisis: Russell’s paradox {x | x 6∈ x} (1901)
→ responses: Brouwer’s Intuitionism, Hilbert’s Formalism, ...
Ideas: restricting set-formation, set-class distinction, axioms
Axiomatic set theory: ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel 1908/22)
Axioms: extensionality, empty set, pairs, union, power set,
infinity, foundation, replacement, choice (∼ enough for math)
Infinite counting: 0, 1, 2, . . . ω, ω + 1, . . . ω + ω, . . . ω1, . . .
Ordinal number: set of its predecessors, α = {β | β < α}
Cumulative hierarchy: layered universe (von Neumann 1928)
Layers: V0 = ∅, Vα+1 = P (Vα), Vλ =
⋃




Hilbert: “From the paradise, that Cantor created for us, no
one can expel us.” (1926)
But: Is ZFC enough to capture all the fruits of the paradise?
Go¨del’s view: No! But we can do something about this.
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Hilbert: “From the paradise, that Cantor created for us, no
one can expel us.” (1926)
But: Is ZFC enough to capture all the fruits of the paradise?
Go¨del’s view: No! But we can do something about this.
Go¨del’s contributions to transcend ZFC:
1. The incompleteness theorems
2. Introducing the inner model technique (L, HOD)
3. Relative consistency of CH: Con(ZF )→ Con(ZFC +GCH)
4. An optimistic ontological realism and epistemic pragmatism
5. Go¨del’s program (rational search for new set-theoretic axioms)
New axioms - prologue
Go¨del’s 2nd incompleteness theorem (1931):
No consistent formal system including elementary arithmetic
[e.g. ZFC] can prove its own consistency.
A first source for (infinitely many) new justified set properties:
• ZFC + Con(ZFC), ZFC + Con(ZFC + Con(ZFC)), ...
Go¨del (1946): “ ... there cannot exist any formalism which would
embrace all these steps; but this does not exclude that ... [they]
could be described and and collected in some nonconstructive
way. In set theory, e.g., ... by stronger and stronger axioms of
infinity ... ”
But, are there also natural assertions independent from ZFC? Yes!
Hilbert’s first problem
Continuum Hypothesis: Every set of reals is either bijective
(same size) to N = {0, 1, 2, ...}, or to the reals R (Cantor 1878).
Cantor tried hard, but failed to settle CH
CH: Nr 1 of Hilbert’s 23 unsolved math. problems (1900)
Attack 1: Go¨del’s constructible sub-universe L (1940):
• ZF ` Con(ZF )→ Con(ZFC + CH)
Attack 2: Cohen’s revolutionary forcing technique (1963):
• ZF ` Con(ZF )→ Con(ZFC + ¬CH)
Hence: CH is independent from ZFC!
Popular lazy conclusion: CH is not a definite problem.
Go¨del: It may well be decided by new intuitive axioms!
The constructible universe
Go¨del (1940): Every model of ZF includes a constructible sub-
universe L verifying AC, CH, and V=L: universe is constructible
Def (X) := 1st-order-definable subsets with parameters over (X,∈)
L0 = ∅, Lα+1 = Def (Lα), Lλ = ∪α<λLα, L = ∪αLα
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V=L ... a desirable new axiom for completing ZFC?
• ZFC+V=L decides CH
• offers a detailed (but ugly) picture of definable sets of reals
• restricts the universe of sets, precludes strong axioms of infinity
Go¨del’s answer: No!
The realist’s tale
Go¨del - a self-described platonist and realist, looking beyond ZFC.
“ ... mathematics describes a non-sensual reality ... independently of the human mind and
is only perceived, and probably very incompletely by the human mind.” (Go¨del 1951)
“ ... [the ZFC axioms] do not contain a complete description of that [well-determined
mathematical] reality.” (Go¨del 70s)
“ ... the fact that the [ZFC] axioms force themselves upon us as true. I don’t see any reason
why we should have less confidence in ... mathematical intuition, than in perception, ... a
question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in the future” (Go¨del 1964)
“ ... the existence of an intuition which is sufficiently clear to produce the axioms of set
theory and an open series of extensions to them suffices to give meaning to the question of
the truth or falsity of propositions like Cantor’s continuum hypothesis.” (Go¨del 1947)
The realist’s tasks
Go¨del’s views were well supported by new axioms of infinity.
“ ... these axioms [inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals] show clearly, not only that the ax-
iomatic system of set theory as known today is incomplete, ... can be supplemented without
arbitrariness by new axioms which are only the natural continuation of those set up so far.”
(Go¨del 1947)
But less so for CH. Go¨del’s direct arguments against CH based on
geometric intuition (Go¨del 1947) were met with skepticism - just
like the Banach-Tarski “paradox” ultimately did not discredit AC.
On the other hand, while Go¨del believed in rational mathematical
intuition, he was realistic:
“ ... mathematical intuition need not be conceived as a faculty giving immediate knowledge
of the objects concerned.” (Go¨del 70s)
The realist’s progress
Go¨del expected and hoped for new intrinsically justified principles
and resulting axioms. But he was aware that conceptual insight is
evolving and needs differentiation.
“ ... probably ... there exist other [axioms] based on hitherto unknown principles ... which
a more profound understanding of the concepts underlying logic and mathematics would
enable us to recognize as implied by these concepts.” (Go¨del 1947)
“ ... strong axioms of infinity of an entirely new kind [measurable cardinals] ... implies the
existence of non-constructible sets. ... implied by the general concept of set in the same
sense as Mahlo’s has not been made clear yet. ... However they are supported by strong
arguments from analogy ... .” (Go¨del 1966)
Go¨dels program
Go¨del was also ready to consider extrinsic justifications, at least
as a guide to mathematical reality.
“ ... There might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable [including mathematical
intuition] consequences ... that quite irrespective of their intrinsic necessity they would
have to be assumed in the same sense as any well-established physical theory.” (Go¨del
1947)
A highly prescient remark, extensively confirmed, and well in line
with the current turn in the philosophy of mathematics towards
mathematical practice.
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Go¨del’s program (in a nutshell): Discover new intrinsi-
cally or extrinsically justified set-theoretic axioms to elucidate
the concept of set, and in particular to decide CH.
Go¨del’s principles
In the 70s, Go¨del identified 5 principles for axiom choice:
1. Intuitive range. Overviewable multitudes can be represented
by sets, which essentially justifies ZFC.
2. Closure principle. Closure properties of the universe are also
realized within specific sets (e.g. inaccessible, Mahlo cardinals).
3. Reflection principle. The universe of sets is structurally
indefinable, indiscernible from its initial segments “in any logic of
finite or transfinite type, including infinitary logics ”. See Rein-
hardt’s strong reflection axioms (1974).
4. Extensionalization. Generalize principles for sets based on
defining properties to arbitrary extensions.
5. Uniformity. Properties of smaller infinite sets or cardinals,
e.g. of the first infinite ordinal ω, reappear - suitably adapted - at
arbitrary high levels (link with reflection).
Axioms for the 21st century
Three major types of new axioms:
• Large cardinal axioms
- implement the idea of maximality (→ reflection, uniformity)
Promising evidence: large cardinals are (essentially) linearly
ordered according to their relative consistency strength:
A1 con A2 iff Con(ZFC + A2) `ZFC Con(ZFC + A1)
A quasi-universal yardstick for measuring consistency strength!
• Axioms of determinacy
- existence of winning strategies for some infinite integer games
• Forcing axioms
- make forcing possible in broader contexts
Large cardinals
When is κ a large cardinal? Reflection and Uniformity
• Weak reflection: Vκ is like V , e.g. inaccessible cardinals
• Finite-infinite analogy: e.g. strong compactness, i.e.
T with |T | ≥ κ is satisfiable in the infinitary logic Lκ,κ iff
all the subsets S ⊆ T with |S| < κ are satisfiable
• Strong reflection/uniformity principles, e.g. 1-extendibility:
elementary embedding j : Vκ+1 7→ Vλ+1 (κ < λ) (“κ like λ”)
Sad fact: Standard large cardinals cannot decide CH
... because they are invariant under forcing CH or ¬CH
Axioms of determinacy
Axiom of determinacy (AD): Any perfect information number
game of length ω is determined, i.e. one player has a winning strategy
(always (n0,m1, n2, . . .) ∈ WinI , or ... ∈ WinII = R−WinI)
• ZFC: limited determinacy, only for simple (e.g. closed) WinI
• ZFC: AD fails, inconsistent with the axiom of choice
ZFC + suitable large cardinals:
• L(R) |= ZF + AD and V |= PD (det. for projective sets)
• Th(L(R)) is invariant under forcing
• Nice properties for definable sets of reals
(e.g. Lebesgue measurable).
Forcing axioms
Forcing: (sloppily) adding a new set G to M |= ZFC
Tool for relative consistency/independence proofs (Cohen 63)
Forcing axioms: more forcing opportunities (indep. of ZFC)
Martin’s maximum: decides CH (2ℵ0 = ℵ2) + implies PD
+ solves Whitehead’s problem (no) → extrinsic justification!
Beyond: ZFC + very large cardinals + very strong forcing:
can decide much of 3rd-order arithmetic (where CH lives)
→ These are amazing results!
Conclusion
Go¨del’s program today:
An active, far-reaching, and multi-faceted research endeavour
• helping to elucidate Cantor’s set concept,
• pushing back the frontiers of decidability/knowledge,
• closing up on CH, and
• implementing a large-scale experiment probing the viability and
limits of mathematical realism!
A century after Go¨del chased us from Hilbert’s promised land,
in some way, his ideas help us to find a way back
